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Abstract 
What determines the proportion of a firm’s income that workers receive as compensation? This 
paper uses longitudinal firm data from a period of substantial labor share variation to 
understand the firm-level determinants of the labor share of income—a question that has so far 
only been addressed with country- and sector-level data. Firms with greater market power and 
a higher ratio of capital to labor allocate a smaller proportion of their value added to workers. 
These results suggest that firm-level drivers play a key role in the evolution of the aggregate 
labor share, which have declined significantly since the 1970s. 
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1. Introduction 
The classic economic question of how rents are distributed among the factors of production 
has recently returned to the fore, motivated by a substantial decline in labor’s share of 
national income in many of the world’s economies since the 1970s (Rodríguez and Jayadev, 
2010; Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; IMF, 2017). Figure 
1 illustrates this decline for the G7 countries. From a starting point of approximately 70% in 
1970, the aggregate labor share of income in this group of advanced economies has declined 
by an average 2 percentage points per decade. This persistent downward trend contrasts with 
the historical stylized fact of long-run stability of the labor share, which was prominently 
noted by Keynes (1939) and Kaldor (1957) and has since become a standard assumption in 
many micro- and macroeconomic models. 
Several potential causes of the decline in the global labor share have been proposed. 
One leading account is that technological change or declines in the price of capital relative to 
labor have led firms to substitute capital for labor, thus decreasing the overall share of income 
that accrues to the latter factor of production (Acemoglu, 2003; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 
2003; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). Another is that deregulation or other drivers has 
increased the market power of firms, raising the profit share of income at the expense of the 
labor share (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Azmat, Manning, and Van Reenen, 2012; Barkai, 
2016; Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen, 2017; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 
2017). To date, however, both explanations have only been tested at the country and sector 
level, even though the aggregate labor share is a result of the production decisions and wage-
setting processes occurring at individual, heterogeneous firms. In this paper, I propose a 
methodology for calculating the labor share of value added at the firm level and use UK data 
to show that the labor share varies significantly across firms, even within narrowly-defined 
sectors, as well as within firms over time. I then investigate what determines the labor share 
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at individual firms. I find that firms with greater market power and a higher ratio of capital to 
labor allocate a smaller proportion of their value added to workers. These results contribute to 
a better understanding of the drivers of changes in aggregate factor income shares. 
To motivate why the labor share might vary across and within firms, I describe a 
simple model of a firm that employs capital and labor to produce a final good in an 
imperfectly competitive product market. When the optimal combination of inputs is chosen to 
maximize profits, the labor share is determined by the firm’s market power and the capital 
intensity of production. Market power matters for the labor share because if a firm can set the 
price of its product at a higher mark-up over cost, then a greater share of value added will go 
to profits, at the expense of labor. Capital intensity matters too, because if a production 
process is highly automated and requires little labor input, then under certain conditions, a 
higher proportion of the firm's value added will be allocated towards compensating the 
suppliers of capital. In the model, the exact nature of the relationship between capital 
intensity and the labor share depends on the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital and the nature of technical progress. Whether the labor share is higher or lower at 
firms that employ more capital relative to labor is therefore an empirical question. 
To test whether a firm’s market power and capital intensity impacts the labor share, I 
use a large longitudinal dataset of firms in the United Kingdom covering the period from 
2005 to 2012, during which the aggregate labor share experienced substantial fluctuations. 
Thanks to mandatory filing requirements that affect nearly all incorporated businesses in the 
UK, it is possible to calculate the labor share of value added for a wide universe of firms, 
including small and medium enterprises, operating across a variety of sectors. Using the 
model to motivate some potential drivers of this heterogeneity, I find an inverse relationship 
between a firm’s labor share and its market power (measured by the market share), and 
between the labor share and the capital intensity of production (measured by the capital-labor 
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ratio). To account for potential endogeneity that may result, for instance, from a joint 
response of variables to unobserved shocks, I estimate dynamic specifications of the model 
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The finding that the labor share is 
inversely related to the firm’s market power and capital intensity is robust to alternative 
econometric methods, definitions of key variables, sample selection decisions, and empirical 
specifications. 
The results of this paper have several policy implications. As technological 
developments and capital accumulation drive many economies to become more capital 
intensive, my estimates suggest that labor’s share of aggregate income may continue to 
decline. Similarly, the labor share might remain under pressure if economic activity becomes 
increasingly concentrated in a smaller number of firms that wield greater market power at the 
expense of the consumer, as some authors have suggested is the case (Barkai, 2016; Autor et 
al., 2017; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). Moreover, a declining labor share implies a 
rising disconnect between average productivity and pay within the economy. This is because 
the labor share of value added can be expressed as the ratio of average compensation to the 
average product of labor. The link between productivity and pay matters greatly to 
households, because wages and salaries represent by far the largest source of household 
income in most developed countries. Understanding the determinants of firm-level labor 
shares is therefore important for assessing the potential impact of future productivity gains or 
losses on the earnings of the average household.  
Does the finding that higher capital intensity of production lowers the labor share of 
income mean that in the aggregate, capital and labor are substitutes? This result is consistent 
with some strands of the factor share literature. For instance, Karabarbounis and Neiman 
(2014) estimate an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor greater than 1 in their 
cross-country analysis. In addition, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) find a negative 
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relationship between the labor share and the capital-to-output ratio in sector-level data from 
selected OECD countries. Piketty’s (2014) explanation of the global evolution of aggregate 
income shares of capital and labor also relies on the high substitutability of these two factors 
of production. On the other hand, an inverse relationship between capital intensity and the 
labor share appears to be at odds with a large part of the literature that focuses specifically on 
estimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The value of this elasticity 
continues to be a matter of debate. While available estimates vary widely depending on the 
methodology and context, often exceeding 1, many authors find lower values that imply a far 
lesser degree of substitutability (see Chirinko, 2008, for a survey, and Knoblach, Rößler, and 
Zwerschke, 2016, for a meta-analysis of US studies).  
One possible reason for the divergent estimates of the aggregate elasticity of 
substitution is that different classes of capital and labor are substitutable with one another to a 
different extent. To understand whether this might drive my overall results, I carry out two 
tests. First, I divide the sample into high-wage and low-wage firms, based on average 
compensation per employee. I find that the negative effect of capital intensity on the labor 
share is driven mainly by low-wage firms. Under the assumption that the average wage level 
at a firm is a proxy for the average skill level of the workforce, these results imply that it is 
mainly low-skilled labor that is substitutable for capital, rather than high-skilled labor. 
Second, I consider the effects of tangible and intangible capital separately, based on the book 
value of long-term tangible and intangible assets reported in firms’ financial statements. 
Tangible assets are physical, fixed items such as machinery, buildings, and land, while 
intangible assets represent nonphysical concepts such as patents, trademarks, and goodwill. 
While it is often difficult to value intangible assets for accounting purposes, I find evidence 
that an increase in intangible assets per employee has a positive effect on the labor share of 
high-wage firms, suggesting low substitutability between intangible capital and high-skilled 
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labor. The outcomes of both tests are consistent with intuition provided by the hypothesis of 
capital-skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969). The paper thus contributes to bridging the 
gap between the two opposing views on the potential impact of increases in capital intensity 
on the labor share. 
My results complement the macroeconomic literature on factor shares by focusing on 
the determinants of the labor share at individual firms. Existing theoretical models of 
aggregate labor share determination ascribe a leading role to factors that, in practice, vary 
across narrowly-defined sectors and individual firms, such as the characteristics of production 
technologies, relative quantities of capital and labor inputs, and the extent of monopoly 
power in the product market (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Azmat et al., 2012; Barkai, 
2016; Autor et al., 2017; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). The paper’s contributions to this 
literature are to: a) construct firm-level measures of these variables using panel microdata, b) 
show that the labor share varies substantially across firms, as well as within firms over time, 
and c) exploit this variation to test hypotheses previously proposed in the context of a 
representative firm and measured only using aggregate data. A firm-level focus is motivated 
by the fact that in developed economies, most economic activity outside the public sector is 
formally organized in firms. In the UK, for instance, the corporate sector represents 
approximately 65% of aggregate gross value added, while private-sector employees account 
for 75% of total employment (ONS, 2016). The sharing of income between labor and other 
factors of production thus occurs primarily at this level. Understanding how the labor share at 
individual firms is determined is therefore helpful for understanding the distribution of 
aggregate national income. 
This paper also extends a small body of recent research that has begun to use firm-
level data to analyze aggregate labor share trends. Growiec (2012) uses data on Polish firms 
to study the impact of entry/exit behavior, ownership, and market conditions on labor share 
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fluctuations. However, the author’s main focus is on short-run aggregate labor share 
dynamics, whereas I assess the role of firm and market characteristics in determining the 
level of the labor share at individual firms. Siegenthaler and Stucki (2015) exploit a survey of 
4,000 Swiss manufacturing, construction and business service firms to estimate correlations 
between the labor share and a firm’s use of computers, number of competitors, modern 
organizational arrangements, participation in export markets, bargaining coverage, and the 
share of female employees. In contrast to that paper, I use a large panel of firms operating in 
all sectors of the business economy to test two leading hypothesized drivers of labor share 
determination, capital intensity and market power. Moreover, I use methods designed to 
address the potential endogeneity or simultaneity biases that may arise in estimating the 
magnitude and direction of these relationships. Finally, Autor et al. (2017) use firm data from 
several countries to construct measures of industry concentration and relate them to sector-
level labor share trends. The authors build a model, in which highly productive “superstar” 
firms capture an increasing market share, leading to a fall in the aggregate labor share 
through a reallocation of activity to such firms. Imposing a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, which precludes any role for capital intensity, they document an empirical 
association between rising industry concentration and declining labor shares within sectors. 
My paper complements the analysis of Autor et al. (2017) in two main ways. First, it assesses 
the relative effect of various determinants of the labor share at the level of individual firms, 
rather than examining sectoral trends. Second, it allows both capital intensity and market 
power to affect a firm’s labor share, allowing the magnitude of these two effects to be 
compared. The role of capital intensity is particularly relevant, given the threat of labor-to-
capital substitution in many industrialized markets and its potential to put further downward 
pressure on the aggregate labor share in the future. Overall, my results suggest that to 
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understand the underlying causes of the trends in the aggregate labor share, we should look 
closely to firms, and the environment that they operate in, for answers. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how to 
measure the labor share of income at the firm level and documents the dispersion of labor 
shares across firms and within firms over time. A simple model of the determinants of the 
firm-level labor share is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 
outlines the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the results and tests their robustness, while 
Section 7 discusses the role of human capital and the firm’s labor market power in 
determining the labor share. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring the labor share of income at the firm level 
In this section, I discuss two types of contextual information relevant for the analysis of the 
determinants of the labor share. First, I discuss how to measure the labor share of income 
using data from firms’ financial reports in a way that mirrors the underlying economic 
concept. Then, I show that firm-level labor shares are highly dispersed, even within narrowly-
defined sectors, which is inconsistent with the predictions of a fully competitive model. This 
observation motivates the remainder of the paper, which explores the role of market power 
and capital intensity in labor share setting. 
The labor share is defined as the ratio of labor cost to some measure of income. In 
standard formulations based on national accounts, the numerator typically includes both wage 
and non-wage compensation of employees. In the denominator, income is usually measured 
by aggregate gross value added.1 
                                                          
1 In the SNA 2008 national accounting framework, compensation of employees includes wages and salaries, 
paid in cash or in kind, as well as employer contributions to pensions, healthcare, and social insurance. Gross 
value added is often used as a measure of income when the labor share is calculated for individual sectors or 
regions. This is because GDP includes taxes on products, such as VAT, which are only known for the whole 
economy. In the UK, GVA accounts for approximately 90% of GDP (ONS, 2016). 
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Labor Share =
Labor Compensation
Income
=
Wage × Labor
Price of Value Added × Real Value Added
 
A well-documented problem with this approach is that it does not account correctly for self-
employed individuals. While the output of the self-employed is part of national income, the 
labor component of their remuneration is not captured in the compensation of employees. 
This understates the labor share and affects cross-country comparisons (Gollin, 2002).2 
In this paper, I focus on the firm-level labor share, using data on incorporated 
businesses. One advantage over macroeconomic data is that focusing on firms and their 
employees removes the confounding effects of self-employment on labor share estimates. 
Although some self-employed individuals may in fact operate as incorporated businesses, 
their impact on the data is mitigated by showing that the conclusions of this paper hold when 
the smallest firms are excluded. 
At the firm level, I define the labor share as the ratio of total employment expense to 
gross value added. Like in the national accounts, employee compensation reported by 
individual firms includes non-wage expenses, such as pension and health insurance expenses, 
as well as social security taxes. I estimate firm-level gross value added as sales minus the cost 
of intermediate inputs other than employee compensation (calculated from the financial 
statements as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization plus employee 
compensation expense), adjusted for inventory growth: 
Firm-Level Labor Share =
Employee Compensation
Gross Value Added
=
Employee Compensation
Sales - Intermediate Inputs + ∆ Inventories
 
Adding the change in inventories to the denominator aligns the firm-level measure of 
value added with the corresponding economic concept of revenue-based output. Consider 
                                                          
2 Guerriero (2012) reviews a range of adjustments to the aggregate labor share proposed in the macroeconomic 
literature. The income of sole proprietors and unincorporated businesses (“mixed income”) represents 
approximately 7% of total GVA in the UK (France 7%, Germany 10%, United States 10%). 
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what would happen if inventory changes were ignored. A firm that has produced goods in a 
given period but has not yet sold them will have accounted for the full cost of labor, capital, 
and other inputs used in production. Sales net of the cost of intermediate inputs will thus be 
low, and the labor share will be overstated. Conversely, reported sales can reflect the running 
down of inventories of final goods produced in earlier periods. 
The adjustment for inventory changes is consistent with the way aggregate gross 
value added is calculated in the national accounts (ONS, 2016). The existing literature on 
firm-level labor shares has not incorporated this adjustment into its measures of gross value 
added. However, year-to-year inventory changes at individual firms can be large. Excluding 
them from the calculation of gross value added can affect the conclusions about the aggregate 
evolution of the labor share. I demonstrate this in Section 4, in the context of the data sample. 
When the numerator and denominator are divided by the number of employees, the 
labor share becomes a ratio of the average wage to the average product of labor:3 
Firm-Level Labor Share =
Employee Compensation
Number of Employees
Gross Value Added
Number of Employees
=
Average Compensation
Average Product of Labor
 
The lower the labor share, the greater the gap between wages and average productivity. Firms 
that have low labor shares thus undercompensate workers relative to the amount of output 
they create. A declining labor share thus implies a “decoupling” of wages and productivity 
and a shift in how the benefits of economic activity are shared with workers.  
What does basic economic theory predict for the variation of labor shares across 
firms? In a framework of competitive markets and free mobility of homogeneous input 
factors, all profit-maximizing firms with identical, well-behaved production functions will 
                                                          
3 Average wages and productivity are expressed on a per-employee basis, as I do not have firm-level data on 
hours worked. Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013) analyze the relationship between aggregate wage and productivity 
growth in the UK using a variety of measures and macroeconomic data sources. 
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choose the same technologically-efficient input allocation. In equilibrium, each factor will be 
paid its marginal product, and the labor shares will be equal across firms. Nothing will be 
gained by using firm-, rather than sector-level, data to analyze the determinants of the labor 
share. 
However, the data shows wide dispersion in firm labor shares. Table 1 presents 
measures of between-firm and within-firm variation in the labor share and its components, 
both in levels and in logs, derived from the random-effects model, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 applied 
to the pooled sample. Between-firm variation (𝜎𝑢/|?̅?|) is measured as the standard deviation 
of the error term 𝑢𝑖 normalized by its mean, while within-firm variation (𝜎𝜀/|?̅?|) is measured 
by the standard deviation of 𝜀𝑖𝑡, normalized by its mean. When the labor share is measured in 
levels, between-firm variation is 0.40, and within-firm variation is 0.60, such that 31% of the 
variance is due to differences across firms. The corresponding measures are 1.14 and 1.08 
when the labor share is measured in logs, with 53% of the variance arising between firms. 
The empirical strategy in this paper exploits both sources of variation. 
The simplest framework that predicts no dispersion of the labor share also predicts no 
dispersion in its individual components. Table 1 shows that both average compensation and 
the average product of labor vary widely in the sample, and most of this variation is across 
firms in the same industry. The fact that the ratio of these two variables is also dispersed 
means that the numerator and denominator do not correlate perfectly. One way to see this is 
to regress average compensation and the average product of labor and calculate 1 − 𝑅2 to 
obtain the proportion of total variation in the former that is not explained by the latter. 
Controlling for year and 4-digit sector fixed effects, this proportion is 54% when the 
variables are measured in levels and 42% when the variables are measured in logs. The 
remainder of this paper investigates the sources of this variation. 
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3. Why might capital intensity and market power matter for the labor share? 
This section outlines a simple model to illustrate why the labor share may differ across firms 
within a given sector, even under the assumption that the production technologies are 
identical. The aim is to motivate the empirical analysis that follows in an intuitive manner 
before proceeding to a discussion of the data and the empirical strategy.4 
To see why a firm’s labor share might be related to its market power and the capital 
intensity of production, consider a profit-maximizing firm 𝑖 with the production function 𝑌𝑖 =
𝑌(𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖), where 𝑌𝑖 is output, 𝐿𝑖 is labor, 𝐾𝑖 is capital, and 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 are labor- and 
capital-augmenting productivity, respectively, which can vary across firms. Labor and capital 
are supplied elastically at the wage 𝑤 and rental rate 𝑟, but the product market is imperfectly 
competitive.5 From the first-order condition for labor, the labor share is 
𝑠𝑖
𝐿 ≡
𝑤𝐿𝑖
𝑃𝑖𝑌𝑖
= 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 (1 +
1
𝜂𝑖
) (1) 
where 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 =
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝜕𝐿𝑖
𝐿𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 is the partial elasticity of output with respect to labor and 𝜂𝑖 =
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝑃𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 is the 
price elasticity of demand. The first term, 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿, is a function of the productivity parameters 
and the labor and capital inputs. The firm’s labor share thus depends on the relative 
productivity-augmented quantities of the factors employed in production. The sign of the 
relationship between the labor share and the relative quantities of capital and labor inputs is 
determined by the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.6  
                                                          
4 For a discussion of similar predictions generated by general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition, 
see Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Barkai (2016). 
5 Appendix C contains supporting derivations of key equations in the paper. The assumption of a perfectly 
competitive labor market is relaxed in Section 7.  
6 This point was first raised by Hicks (1932) and Robinson (1933). If the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor is exactly 1 (like in the model of Autor et al. (2017), who assume a Cobb-Douglas production 
function), then the partial elasticity of output with respect to labor, 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿, will be independent of the firm’s 
capital-to-labor ratio. In that scenario, the empirical analysis that follows should find that capital per worker 
does not matter for a firm’s labor share (which is not the case). Arpaia, Pérez, and Pichelmann (2009) develop a 
model of the aggregate labor share where low- and high-skilled labor differ in their elasticity of substitution with 
respect to capital. 
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If returns to scale in production are constant, then the first term of equation (1) can be 
expressed more transparently as a function of the labor-to-capital ratio and the firm-specific 
productivity parameters: 
𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 ≡
𝑌𝐿(𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖, 𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖)
𝑌(𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖, 𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖)
𝐿𝑖 = (
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖
)
𝑌𝐿 (
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖
, 1)
𝑌 (
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖
, 1)
= 𝑔 (
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖
) (2) 
where 𝑌𝐿 is the partial derivative of output with respect to labor. The empirical analysis that 
follows will therefore test whether there is a relationship between the relative factor inputs 
(measured as net tangible assets per employee) and the firm’s labor share, with the ratio of 
productivity parameters absorbed by firm fixed effects.  
The second term of equation (1) denotes the firm’s product market power and is 
determined by the characteristics of demand. In the baseline specification of my empirical 
analysis, I use the firm’s share of 4-digit sector sales to proxy for its product market power. 
This is motivated by the observation that some models of imperfect competition predict a 
direct relationship between the price elasticity of demand and firms’ market shares in 
equilibrium. For example, consider a Cournot oligopoly with 𝑛 firms, each producing a 
homogenous product with marginal cost 𝑐𝑖 and facing a linear inverse demand curve, 𝑃 =
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄, where 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖  is total quantity produced. In equilibrium, firm 𝑖’s market share is 
𝑠𝑖
𝑀 ≡
𝑞𝑖
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖
=
𝑛+1
𝑛
𝑎−𝑐𝑖
𝑎−𝑐̅
− 1, where 𝑐̅ is the average marginal cost. The market share can be 
expressed in terms of the elasticity of demand, 𝜂, as  
𝑠𝑖
𝑀 =
(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑎 + 𝑛𝑐̅
(−𝜂) − 1 (3) 
This illustrates a possible link between firms’ market shares and the price elasticity of 
demand.7 The intuition is that when there are fewer firms in a sector, each firm’s market 
                                                          
7 In the empirical model, firm fixed effects absorb any firm-specific cost advantage, which will affect the 
relationship between market share and equilibrium price elasticity of demand in this model if marginal costs are 
heterogeneous and the differences are persistent. Note that if demand is iso-elastic, there will be no relationship 
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share is higher. Lower competition leads to greater monopoly power and a lower total 
quantity produced, which corresponds to a more elastic part of the demand curve. This simple 
model motivates the empirical analysis that follows, which uses longitudinal firm data to 
estimate the firm-level determinants of the labor share. 
 
4. Data 
The main source of data for my analysis is the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) 
database supplied by Bureau van Dijk. It contains the financial filings of UK firms that 
submit annual reports to Companies House, a government agency responsible for maintaining 
the official company register. Virtually all companies in the UK, except the smallest ones, are 
legally required to file an audited annual report. In 2015, the compliance rate with this 
requirement was 99.1% (Companies House, 2015). Financial information follows 
standardized accounting conventions. The audit requirement helps ensure that the data is of 
high quality, partially mitigating potential concerns about reporting error. For these reasons, 
FAME data is routinely used in research (e.g., Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen, 2011). 
Thanks to strict reporting requirements, FAME contains information on a large 
number of private and unlisted companies. Such companies represent the bulk of the total 
firm count in the UK (and in most other countries), as well as a high proportion of aggregate 
employment. The inclusion of small, private firms represents both an opportunity and a 
challenge. On the one hand, it generates a more heterogeneous and representative sample of 
firms than databases of listed companies, which exclude most small and medium enterprises. 
On the other hand, many small firms are likely to be family businesses or self-employed 
individuals operating as incorporated businesses. The labor share of such firms can easily be 
                                                          
between the (constant) price elasticity of demand and market shares as industry concentration changes. 
However, I show in Section 6 that the conclusions about the role of market power in determining the firm-level 
labor share hold in a number of different specifications. 
 14 
 
mismeasured, since the labor and capital components of compensation are difficult to 
disentangle in the case of business owners. Section 6 considers this issue explicitly and shows 
that the results of this paper are robust to excluding the smallest firms from the sample. 
The sample for analysis is defined by including all firms that report information on 
labor compensation, sales, tangible assets, employment, and the line items needed to calculate 
value added. This requirement makes the firms in the sample larger, on average, in terms of 
sales and employment than the universe of UK firms. The financial sector is excluded due to 
methodological differences in the calculation of value added. I also exclude sectors with a 
substantial presence of non-market services (public administration, health, education, arts, 
etc.), where value added can be difficult to measure. To avoid capturing foreign subsidiaries 
of UK firms and their employees, I use unconsolidated financial accounts. 
The result is a panel of 119,764 observations on 31,402 firms, covering the period 
from 2005 to 2012. This period was characterized by substantial variation in the aggregate 
labor share. Figure 2 shows that the aggregate labor share in the sample closely tracks the 
corporate sector labor share calculated from the national accounts, and follows a similar 
downward trend as the labor share in the UK economy and other G7 countries. (Notably, 
while the Great Recession led the labor share to peak in 2009 as the value of output dropped 
precipitously, it does not seem to have fundamentally altered the general downward trend 
over this period.) The firms in the sample represent a substantial proportion of economic 
activity generated by the UK non-financial corporate sector. In the last year of the sample 
period, 2012, they generated total value added of £275bn, employed 5.8 million people, and 
spent £167bn on employee compensation.  
The sample includes firms of all sizes – from those employing a handful of 
individuals to the largest businesses in the economy with hundreds of thousands of 
employees. Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics for firm sales, employment, and the 
 15 
 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Nominal values are converted to constant prices 
using the GDP deflator. The median firm reports sales of £12 million and employment of 73. 
It has a labor share of value added of 75%, £11,000 of tangible assets (net of accumulated 
depreciation) per employee, and a share of 4-digit sector sales of less than 1%. 
As mentioned in the discussion on measurement above, the year-to-year change in 
inventories can be very large for an individual firm, substantially affecting firm-level 
estimates of gross value added (and therefore the labor share). Inventory changes in the 
sample range from a minimum of -£1.4bn to a maximum of +£1.8bn. To see the importance 
of including inventory changes for the correct measurement of gross value added, consider 
the impact of the financial crisis, which represented the largest shock to aggregate output 
during the sample period. With the correct adjustment for inventory changes, aggregate 
nominal GVA in the sample fell by 5.4% from 2008 to 2009. This falls squarely between the 
4.3% decrease reported in the national accounts for “private non-financial corporations” 
(ONS, 2016) and the 6.8% decrease reported in the aggregated results of the Annual Business 
Survey of firms in the “non-financial business sector.”8 On the other hand, excluding the 
inventory adjustment would have led incorrectly to an estimated nominal GVA increase in 
the sample of 0.3%, contrary to the observed trend. This shows that correct measurement of 
the labor share is important for drawing macroeconomic conclusions from firm-level data. 
Table 2 also shows that, on average, a firm’s labor share declines as its capital 
intensity rises. Firms with tangible assets per employee of less than £10,000 have a median 
labor share of 81%. As the capital intensity rises across the sample, the average labor share 
drops precipitously. For instance, firms with £50,000 to £100,000 of tangible assets per 
worker have a median labor share of 66%, while firms with tangible assets per workers of 
                                                          
8 The Annual Business Survey is one of the sources used for calculating aggregate GVA in the national 
accounts, but the national accounts incorporate a number of other adjustments. See the discussion in Section 2 
and ONS (2016) for more details. 
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£100,000 to £500,000 have a median labor share of 52%. In the right tail of firms with 
tangible assets per worker of £500,000 or more, the median labor share is only 20%.  
Similarly, the labor share declines with a firm’s market share. Firms with market 
share within their 4-digit sector of  less than 1% have a median labor share of 76%. The 
average labor share declines gradually for firms observed with higher market shares. Like in 
the case of capital intensity, the right tail of firms with market share of 20% or greater has the 
lowest median labor share of 65%. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship visually. Both capital 
intensity and market power thus appear to be potentially relevant determinants of the firm-
level labor share. 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
To assess whether the negative correlation between a firm’s labor share and its capital 
intensity on one hand, and between the labor share and market share on the other, hold when 
controlling for other confounding variables and addressing potential sources of endogeneity, I 
estimate the following panel data model, based on log-linearized equation (1): 
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 + (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡) (4) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴(0) (6) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿  is the labor share at firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡; (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) is the capital-to-labor ratio and 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 is the 
market share. Technology is permitted to vary across sectors 𝑗. The firm-specific labor share 
is also allowed to be affected by factors specific to the region 𝑟 where the firm is located, and 
by changes in the average labor share over time, denoted by the year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡. In the 
main results that follow, the labor share is calculated as total compensation divided by value 
added to account for intermediate inputs. Capital intensity is calculated as tangible assets net 
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of accumulated depreciation per employee, and product market power is estimated using the 
firm’s share of 4-digit sector sales. I show later that the conclusions of this paper hold when 
using alternative measures of these variables. 
The labor share might also be determined by other sources of firm-level heterogeneity 
besides market power and capital intensity. For instance, there can be permanent differences 
in how value added is shared among labor and other factors of production, which may depend 
on unobserved preferences of management, working conditions or other social and 
organizational factors, or the relative size of the firm-specific productivity parameters 𝐴𝑖 and 
𝐵𝑖. Such differences are captured by the time-invariant parameter 𝑎𝑖 in equation (4). In 
addition, the labor share in any period may be affected by unobserved, firm-specific 
productivity shocks. Following the standard approach used in the literature on estimating firm 
production functions, I allow such shocks to be serially correlated. To derive a tractable 
empirical specification, I assume that these shocks follow an AR(1) process given by 
equation (5), where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are random disturbances. This assumption is motivated by the 
persistence of the firm-specific labor shares, market shares, and capital-to-labor ratios. It is 
satisfactorily tested in the data, as discussed further below. 
Two problems may arise in estimating equation (4) using ordinary least squares. One 
is the potential correlation between the error term and the covariates. For instance, both the 
capital-to-labor ratio and the labor share are likely to be jointly determined in response to 
idiosyncratic shocks, 𝑣𝑖𝑡. In particular, firms may respond to shocks by adjusting the factor 
input ratio. In other words, the firm's choice of capital intensity may be endogenous with 
respect to 𝑣𝑖𝑡, such that 𝐸 [(
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) 𝑣𝑖𝑡] ≠ 0. This will lead to biased results.
9  
                                                          
9 While the literature often assumes that adjusting the capital stock is costly and therefore capital responds to 
shocks with a lag, firms may be able to adjust employment more quickly, particularly via such means as 
adjusting working hours or the use of temporary workers. This would cause the capital-to-labor ratio to change 
quickly as well. In addition, the data I use is based on annual accounting periods, so even if the firm's response 
to the shock is somewhat delayed, part of it may nevertheless appear to be contemporaneous in the sample. 
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A second problem is that time-invariant managerial or organizational characteristics, 
captured by 𝜂𝑖, may be correlated with one or more regressors, such as the firm's choice of 
factor inputs or market position. Reverse causality is also a concern. For instance, firms that 
have a lower labor share than peers (𝑎𝑖 < 0) may find it easier and cheaper to fund increases 
in their capital stock, thanks to their higher profits and the ability to offer a higher return on 
capital. A low labor share might thus cause higher capital intensity, not the other way around. 
If the shocks 𝑣𝑖𝑡 were serially uncorrelated (𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡), then the standard method for 
dealing with these problems would consist of estimating equation (4) in differences to 
eliminate the impact of permanent heterogeneity, 𝑎𝑖, and using instrumental variables to 
address concerns about the correlation between the regressors and the error term. While 
external instruments for firms’ input choices are typically difficult to find, lagged values of 
the endogenous regressors themselves, dated 𝑡 − 2 or earlier, would be potentially valid 
instruments, as they would be uncorrelated with the error term. In other words, the condition 
𝐸[𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝑣𝑖𝑡] = 0 would be satisfied for 𝑠 ≥ 2. 
However, in practice, when the model is estimated using this procedure, the residuals 
exhibit serial correlation. This casts doubt on the validity of a static model and suggests a 
need to model serial correlation in the errors explicitly, like through equations (4) to (6). But 
if the shocks are serially correlated, then the error term is a function of all past disturbances 
𝜀𝑖1 ⋯ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. In this situation lagged values of the regressors are no longer valid instruments. A 
model with firm fixed effects suffers from the same problem. Hence there is no consistent 
way to estimate the static model. 
Instead, the system (4)-(6) can be transformed into a dynamic model containing the 
lagged labor share and lags of the regressors on the right-hand side. Solving (4) for 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 
substituting into the autoregressive process (5), and first-differencing to remove the time-
invariant firm effect gives the autoregressive distributed lag specification, 
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∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝜌∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜋1∆ (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜋2∆ (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜋3∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 + 𝜋4∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
where 𝜋1 = 𝛽1,  𝜋2 = −𝜌𝛽1, 𝜋3 = 𝛽2, and 𝜋4 = −𝜌𝛽2. Following this transformation, lags 
of any regressor 𝑥𝑖𝑡 dated 𝑡 − 2 or earlier are now potentially valid instruments for 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, as 𝐸[𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≥ 2. Similarly, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿  can be instrumented with lags of 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿  
dated 𝑡 − 2 or earlier. The long-run relationship between capital intensity and the labor share 
is then given by 
𝜋1+𝜋2
1−𝜌
. Similarly, the long-run effect of market share on the labor share is 
𝜋3+𝜋4
1−𝜌
. These parameters can be estimated consistently using two-stage least squares or the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
Intuitively, a dynamic model with lags of the labor share, capital intensity, and market 
share can be motivated by a delayed response of employment, investment, wages or sales to 
shocks, especially when adjustments are costly. In the data, firms’ labor shares, capital-to-
labor ratios, and market shares are highly persistent over time. This observation is consistent 
with either the presence of adjustment lags or serially correlated productivity shocks. 
To estimate the coefficient vector (𝜌, 𝜋)', I use the System GMM estimator developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In addition to using equation 
(7) in first differences with lagged levels of the potentially endogenous variables as 
instruments, System GMM exploits the unrestricted version of equation (4) in levels, with 
lagged first-differences as instruments. This approach has two main advantages. First, it uses 
more information by exploiting between-firm variation, which is a more important source of 
overall variability in labor shares than within-firm variation. In the pooled sample, 79% of 
variation in the log labor share is between—rather than within—firms. Second, System GMM 
exhibits a smaller finite-sample bias when the data is persistent (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
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System GMM is the main approach used in the remainder of this paper.10 To avoid 
concerns with overfitting (Roodman 2009), I limit the number of instruments to the lagged 
levels dated 𝑡 − 2 and 𝑡 − 3 in the first-difference equation and lagged differences dated 𝑡 −
1 and 𝑡 − 2 in the levels equation, rather than using all past values. Appendix A contains a 
detailed discussion of the assumptions required for the estimates to be consistent and 
discusses how these assumptions have been tested in the data. The conclusion is that the 
empirical model appears to be well-specified in responding to concerns about serial 
correlation and potential endogeneity of the variables of interest. 
 
6. Results: Firm-level determinants of the labor share of income 
This section presents the findings on the relationship between market power, capital intensity, 
and the labor share. It then explores the robustness of the results to alternative sample and 
variable definitions, and empirical specifications. 
Estimating the empirical model given by equation (4) gives a strong negative 
relationship between the labor share and both market power and capital intensity. Table 3 
presents the main results. The dependent variable in all columns is the log labor share, 
defined as total compensation divided by value added. Column 1 regresses the log labor share 
on capital intensity, measured as the log of net tangible assets per employee, and market 
share, measured as the log of the firm’s share of 4-digit sector sales. Year fixed effects are 
added to account for average trends in the labor share in the economy. The elasticity of the 
labor share with respect to capital intensity is estimated to be -0.079. In other words, a 
doubling of capital intensity is associated with a 7.9% reduction in the labor share.11 The 
                                                          
10 GMM estimation is carried out using the xtabond2 command in Stata, implemented by Roodman (2009), with 
Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction to the standard errors. I also report OLS results with a varying 
range of controls, and with and without firm fixed effects, to provide context for the GMM results. 
11 Note that this is a percentage impact, not a percentage-point impact. The estimated elasticities are interpreted 
in a more intuitive way further below, after the presentation of the results. 
 21 
 
estimated elasticity with respect to market share is much smaller in magnitude, at -0.009. A 
doubling of the market share is thus associated with a 0.9% fall in the labor share. However, 
both effects are highly statistically significant, with a p-value below 1%. Column 2 adds 
sector fixed effects to control for sector-level differences in the labor share. The capital 
intensity estimate falls slightly to -0.067, while the market share estimate increases 
substantially in magnitude to -0.020. Both estimates remain highly statistically significant. 
Column 3 adds region fixed effects to control for any geographic differences in labor share 
setting that could be driven, for instance, by labor market conditions, but the impact on the 
results is negligible. 
OLS estimates thus highlight strong and significant correlations between firms’ labor 
shares, market shares, and the capital intensity of production. However, as discussed earlier, 
the coefficients will be biased in the presence of persistent shocks or unobserved 
heterogeneity in how the labor share is determined at the firm level. Column 4 includes firm 
fixed effects as one way to account for such unobserved heterogeneity. Firm-specific drivers 
of the labor share may include things like within-sector product differentiation, differences in 
production costs relative to competitors, or other aspects of the firm’s management and 
organizational structure. The results reported in this column represent within-firm estimates 
of the effects of an increase in capital intensity or market share on the labor share.  
As discussed in Section 5, fixed-effects estimates may be biased if productivity 
shocks are serially correlated. Column 5 of Table 3 therefore presents the results of GMM 
estimation. This approach attempts to model this serial correlation explicitly while using 
instrumental variable methods to address potential sources of endogeneity of the regressors. 
The elasticity of the labor share with respect to capital intensity is -0.077, similar to the OLS 
results, while the elasticity with respect to market share is -0.184, similar to the results with 
firm fixed effects. Both coefficients are highly statistically significant, suggesting strong links 
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between firms’ labor shares, market shares, and capital intensity. The Arellano and Bond 
(1991) test for serial correlation does not highlight any second-order serial correlation in the 
residuals (p-value 0.903), implying that there is no need to add more lags of the model 
variables to ensure consistent estimation in the GMM framework. Moreover, the Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity (p-
value 0.459). Together with the results of further tests in Appendix A, these diagnostics 
suggest that the model is appropriate for the data and is estimated consistently. 
The GMM estimates imply large effects of changes in a firm’s market power and 
capital intensity on the labor share. For the average firm, a 1 percentage-point increase in 
market share will lower the labor share by 9.5 percentage points, holding capital intensity of 
production constant. If market share is held constant, on the other hand, then the same 9.5 
percentage-point decline in the labor share would also arise if net tangible assets per 
employee increased by approximately £59,000. One way to think about this amount is that it 
is equivalent to 2 times the median employee compensation cost in the sample. Thus, net 
investment equal to two years of labor costs would be expected to reduce the labor share of 
income by almost 10 points, all else remaining constant. 
An alternative way to assess the magnitude of the estimates in the context of the 
sample is to consider how much market shares and capital intensities actually vary across 
firms. Most firms observed in the data have low market shares and low capital intensity, but 
the distributions of both variables are highly skewed to the right, with a large standard 
deviation relative to the mean. A one standard deviation rise in market share (4.4 percentage 
points) is estimated to lower the labor share of the average firm by 42.1 percentage points. A 
move of this size implies almost a tripling of the share of sector sales by the average firm. On 
the other hand, a one standard deviation rise in net tangible assets per employee (£102,000) 
reduces the labor share of the average firm by 16.5 percentage points. While still large, the 
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effect is relatively smaller than that for market share, given the smaller absolute size of the 
estimated elasticity of the labor share with respect to capital intensity. 
The finding that higher capital intensity lowers the labor share is consistent with the 
claims of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Piketty (2014), who explain the trends in 
aggregate factor income shares through an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
greater than one. However, as mentioned above, the degree to which capital and labor are 
substitutable is a matter of ongoing debate.  
One reason why the conclusions about the substitutability of capital and labor may 
vary is that different types of capital assets and workers may substitute or complement each 
other differently. I therefore probe the relationship between capital intensity and the labor 
share in three ways. First, to determine whether the effect of capital intensity differs 
according to the skill level of a firm’s workforce, I split the sample into low-wage and high-
wage firms. I define high-wage firms as those that, on average, are in the top half of the 
annual distribution of total compensation per employee during their presence in the sample. 
Given that firms’ financial reports contain no information about the characteristics of 
individual workers, I take the average wage level to be a proxy for the skill level of the 
employees.12 This helps me judge whether the conclusions about the degree of substitutability 
between capital and labor vary depending on the type of workforce that firms employ. 
Second, to determine whether labor is equally substitutable with different classes of capital, I 
add intangible capital intensity, defined as the log of the book value of intangible assets per 
employee, as a regressor. Third, I combine the two approaches above to determine how the 
two types of workforces and two types of capital interact. 
                                                          
12 Table B2 in the Appendix shows that the sample firms classified as high-wage are more concentrated in 
sectors such as manufacturing, construction, information and communication, and professional, scientific, and 
technical activities, where both a) average wages and b) the average skill level in the employee population 
(measured through years of education and the proportion of employees with a college degree) are indeed higher. 
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It turns out that the aggregate results on capital intensity are driven mainly by low-
wage firms, suggesting that a low-skilled workforce is more substitutable with capital than a 
high-skilled workforce. Moreover, higher intangible capital intensity leads to a higher labor 
share, but only in the case of firms with a high-skilled workforce. These results are presented 
in Table 4. In column 1, tangible capital intensity is interacted with an indicator for whether 
the firm is a high-wage firm. The estimated elasticity for low-wage firms is -0.126, larger in 
magnitude than the aggregate estimate and highly significant. While the estimate for high-
wage firms is also negative at -0.034, it is smaller and not statistically significant. Therefore, 
to the extent that a firm’s average wage level can proxy for the average skills of its 
workforce, these results suggest that high-skilled workers are much less substitutable with 
(tangible) capital than low-skilled workers. Next, column 2 shows that the estimated elasticity 
of the labor share with respect to intangible capital intensity is 0.023 and marginally 
insignificant at a 10% level. Column 3 shows that the estimate on intangible capital intensity 
is driven entirely by high-wage firms. On the assumption that firms with high average wages 
have a workforce with high average skills, this suggests that high-skilled workers are less 
substitutable with intangible capital than low-skilled workers, while low-skilled workers are 
more substitutable with tangible capital than high-skilled workers.  
How robust are the results to the way the sample has been defined and to the details of 
the empirical specification? This is tested in Table 5 by modifying the baseline GMM 
specification in several ways. Columns 1 to 3 address potential concerns with sample 
selection. One such concern is that the universe of incorporated firms that submit financial 
reports to Companies House may include self-employed individuals. I therefore check 
whether the estimated coefficients change when firms that are never observed with more than 
one employees are excluded from the sample. Column 1 reports these results. The estimated 
elasticities are now -0.070 in the case of capital intensity and -0.192 in the case of the market 
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share, both significant at a 1% level and similar in magnitude to those obtained from the full 
sample. The main reason is that the smallest firms are typically not required to supply fully 
detailed financials, and therefore few of them make it into the main sample. Next, column 2 
focuses on firms observed in each year of the sample period. These tend to be larger and 
more established firms. This sub-sample is therefore more likely to satisfy the assumptions of 
System GMM (see Appendix A for a discussion). Again, the results are similar to the 
baseline model in column 5 of Table 3. The estimated effect of capital intensity on the labor 
share is larger in magnitude at -0.095, but the difference is not significant, while the 
estimated effect of the market share is almost identical at -0.182. Finally, column 3 tests the 
impact of outliers by estimating the model using unwinsorized variables. While this adds 
some noise to the data and the coefficient estimates shift slightly, the results remain very 
similar to those in the baseline GMM model. 
Columns (4) to (8) explore different functional forms. Column 4 presents estimates in 
levels, rather than logs. In column 5 only capital intensity is in logs, while the labor share and 
market share are in levels. In column 6, only the labor share is in levels. Columns 7 and 8 add 
squared terms to the log-log model, with the square of both capital intensity and market share 
included in column 7 and only the square of market share in column 8. The market share 
remains negative and statistically significant across these specifications, with differing 
magnitudes in columns 4 to 6 reflecting the fact that the interpretation of the coefficient 
changes depending on whether the variables are expressed in logs or in levels. Similarly, 
market share enters negatively and significantly when its square is included in the log-log 
model, with an elasticity at the mean similar to that obtained in the linear model. Capital 
intensity, on the other hand, is less robust to changes in the model specification.  
Finally, Table 6 shows that the overall conclusions are robust to several alternative 
definitions of the firm-level labor share, capital intensity, and market power. Column 1 
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replaces the dependent variable with the wage share of value added, excluding non-wage 
benefits such as pensions and social security taxes from the numerator. The estimated 
elasticities with respect to capital intensity and market share of -0.070 and -0.201, 
respectively, differ little from those in the baseline specification. This suggests that the 
effects on the labor share operate mainly through wages, and not through other forms of 
compensation. Column 2 redefines capital intensity as total assets per employee to account 
for the potential role of intangible inputs in firms’ production functions and thus in 
determining a firm’s labor share. The elasticity estimates of -0.070 and -0.188 remain in the 
similar range as before. While this could be interpreted to mean that intangible assets are not 
an important input for the average firm, it could also reflect the difficulty associated with 
measuring intangible assets on the balance sheets of firms. Reassuringly, however, using total 
assets as a measure of capital does not change the conclusions.  
Next, columns 3 to 6 test alternative measures of market power. A firm’s share of 4-
digit sector value added, rather than sales, is used in column 3, and the share of sales within 
the sector and NUTS3 region (approximately equivalent to a county) is used in column 4. 
Column 5 then repeats the specification from column 4 while restricting the sample to non-
tradable sectors, as defined by Mano and Castillo (2015). Finally, column 6 estimates market 
power by the log of the ratio of value added to sales, as a proxy for the markup. Since this 
variable is highly correlated with the denominator of the labor share, it is instrumented with 
lags dated 𝑡 − 3 and 𝑡 − 4 for the equation in levels and 𝑡 − 4 and 𝑡 − 5 for the equation in 
first differences, to avoid an overlap with contemporaneous instruments for the lagged labor 
share. The results of all the analyses of alternative measures of market power are 
directionally the same as in the main specification in Table 3. In columns 3 to 5, the 
coefficients on market share range from -0.108 to -0.158 and the coefficients on capital 
intensity range from -0.068 to -0.079. In column 6, the estimated coefficient on the markup is 
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-0.660, which suggests that for an average firm, a 1 percentage-point increase in the markup 
leads to a 1.7 percentage-point decrease in the labor share. All results remain statistically 
significant, with the exception of the capital intensity variable in the last column. This 
confirms that the conclusions of the paper are robust to alternative measures of key variables. 
 
7. Extensions: Human Capital, Labor Market Power, and the Labor Share 
In this section, I examine the impact of workforce characteristics and the firm’s labor market 
power on the labor share in three ways. First, I explore whether enhancing the empirical 
model to include human capital variables changes the main findings. Second, I test two ways 
to account explicitly for the effect of the firm’s labor market power (as distinct from product 
market power) on the labor share. Finally, I use the information on average workforce 
characteristics to address potential measurement problems with the capital intensity variable. 
One aspect of labor share determination that the results in the previous section do not 
take into account is the firm’s position in the labor market. So far, I have assumed that labor 
is supplied elastically to the firm at a constant wage 𝑤. To the extent that labor markets are 
not perfectly competitive, variations in the labor share—both within and across firms—may 
be driven by differences in labor market power. Such differences may arise, for instance, if 
workers are not perfectly mobile across geographies. Moreover, even firms in the same sector 
and location may demand workers with different skills and thus participate in separate labor 
markets (at least in the short term). This can happen, for example, if unobserved product 
differentiation leads to heterogeneous complementarities between firms’ capital assets and 
different classes of labor.  
The firm’s position in the labor market may be an omitted variable affecting the 
results for product market power and capital intensity. This is because labor market 
characteristics might be correlated with firms’ current or historical capital investments and 
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market position. For instance, the tightness of the labor market in a specific skill category 
might affect the type of capital that the firm needs to employ in production and the national 
market share that it can achieve, or vice versa.  
Modifying the simple model outlined in Section 3 to allow for imperfect competition 
in the labor market predicts that the labor share will be inversely related to the firm’s labor 
market power. The first-order condition for labor becomes: 
𝑠𝑖
𝐿 =
𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 (1 +
1
𝜂)
1 +
1
𝜆
 (8) 
where 𝜆 ≥ 0 is the labor supply elasticity. Inelastic supply of labor to the firm (low 𝜆) 
reduces the labor share compared to the case of perfectly competitive labor markets 
(infinitely high 𝜆). This is because highly inelastic labor supply gives the firm greater ability 
to reduce wages without materially restricting the supply of workers willing to work there. 
This situation may arise if there are frictions in the labor market, such as mobility costs that 
limit workers’ ability to seek alternative employment.13 A firm’s labor market power may 
thus be a relevant variable to take into account when estimating the determinants of the labor 
share.  
Unfortunately, FAME does not contain any information about firms’ workforce other 
than total employment. My first step, therefore, is to use the UK Labour Force Survey to 
construct a range of human capital variables that describe the average workforce 
characteristics in each 1-digit sector-region-year cell. These human capital variables mirror 
standard variables found in wage regressions: education, experience, and the percentage of 
employees that are female, married, non-white, UK-born, and that work part-time. I add them 
to the estimated model and check whether a) cells with a greater proportion of groups that 
                                                          
13 Manning (2003) sets out a comprehensive case for the empirical relevance of imperfect competition in the 
labor market, i.e., the supply of labor to an individual firm not being infinitely elastic. 
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might be expected to have lower bargaining power in the labor market are associated with a 
lower labor share, and b) whether controlling for these workforce characteristics changes the 
earlier results on the role of capital intensity and market share. For instance, immigrants, part-
time workers, or other groups with weaker attachment to the labor force or the firm may be 
less able to influence rent-sharing policies.  
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the estimates for the market share and capital 
intensity are unaffected when the human capital variables are simply added as controls to the 
main specification. The labor share appears to be, on average, lower in sector-region cells 
where a higher proportion of employees work part time or hold “other qualifications,” which 
corresponds to low-level vocational and non-standard qualifications. A higher labor market 
participation rate is also associated with a lower average labor share. These results give 
some—albeit imperfect—indication that the labor share is lower at firms operating in sectors 
and regions where the average worker is more weakly positioned in the labor market. 
However, these coefficients have many possible interpretations. For instance, perhaps 
surprisingly, the coefficient on the percentage of college-educated employees is positive and 
significant. Perhaps some of the occupations in this category are susceptible to outsourcing or 
replacement by machines, giving firms greater power over wage setting, but the mechanism 
is unclear. The data cannot distinguish to what extent the estimated relationship between 
workforce characteristics is driven by the tension between the strength of a given group’s 
attachment to the labor market, with the consequential impact on bargaining power, social 
norms, and various forms of selection. 
I therefore attempt to measure firms’ labor market power, over and above these 
average workforce characteristics, in two alternative ways. The first is the proportion of new 
recruits from non-employment in each sector-region cell. Manning (2003) suggests this as a 
measure of firms’ wage-setting power, on the basis that their ability to reduce wages is kept 
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in check by workers’ ability to leave for other employers. The higher the proportion of 
recruits from non-employment, the lower the competition for workers among firms and more 
monopsonistic the labor market. Manning (2003) also shows that in a general equilibrium 
model of the labor market with search frictions, this ratio is monotonically inversely related 
to the ratio of the job arrival rate to the job destruction rate. As it increases, each worker’s 
wage approaches the marginal product. Thus, a high proportion of recruits from non-
employment implies that firms have the power to pay workers significantly less than the 
marginal product and the labor market is farther away from perfect competition. 
Column 2 of Table 7 shows that labor market power measured this way is highly 
significant, with an estimated elasticity of -0.326. This implies that, at the mean, a one 
standard deviation increase in the proportion of recruits from non-employment (4 percentage 
points) is associated with a 1.6 percentage-point reduction in the labor share.14  
Ideally, the proportion of recruits from non-employment would be calculated at the 
level of individual firms. I therefore use a second, alternative measure of a firm’s labor 
market position: the log of the number of firms other than firm 𝑖 present in the same NUTS3 
region (roughly a county in England), as a proxy for competition for labor in the local labor 
market. The results are shown in column 3 of Table 7. To make the interpretation of the 
results clearer, the labor market power variable is multiplied by -1. The estimated elasticity 
with respect to minus the number of competing firms is -0.023. This suggests that a greater 
concentration of firms lowers the labor share, perhaps by making it easier for workers to 
switch jobs without incurring substantial mobility costs. 
There is one other way in which these human variables are helpful, and that is to 
check whether a potential measurement issue with the capital-labor ratio affects the 
                                                          
14 The mean proportion of new recruits from non-employment in the sample is 0.61. While this may seem high, 
it is in the range reported by Manning (2003) for the UK and the US using different periods and data sources. 
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conclusions of this paper. In the theoretical model outlined in Section 3, capital and labor are 
homogeneous, while in practice, there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity across firms 
in the quality of their capital and labor inputs. To the extent that differences in the quality of 
capital equipment are reflected in the purchase price, they will be reflected in the book value 
of tangible assets—the numerator of the capital intensity measure. Heterogeneity in worker 
quality, however, will not be reflected in the number of employees, which forms the 
denominator of the ratio. This suggests a potential measurement problem related to the 
differences in the average wage across firms that may also be related to the labor share. One 
solution would be to measure the labor input using compensation cost, on the assumption that 
wage differences fully reflect the differences in worker quality. However, the denominator of 
the capital intensity would then become the same as the numerator of the dependent variable.  
My approach is therefore to use the human capital variables to derive a quality 
adjustment for each firm’s labor input and use this estimate of “effective labor” to calculate 
an alternative capital intensity measure. I begin by regressing the average compensation per 
employee at each firm on the vector of human capital variables. I use the estimated 
coefficients from this regression to predict an average wage for each firm. I then adjust each 
firm’s total number of employees by the percentage deviation of its predicted wage from the 
mean of all of that year’s predictions. A firm observed in a sector-region cell where the 
characteristics of the workforce predict relatively low wages will thus be treated as having a 
lower effective labor input, and thus higher quality-adjusted capital intensity. The resulting 
headcount adjustment varies from -43% to +47% and increases the standard deviation of firm 
employment in the sample by 10.2%.  
Column 4 of Table 7 shows that the results of replacing the capital intensity variable 
with the adjusted measure are very similar to the baseline specification in Table 3. If 
anything, the estimated elasticity with respect to the capital-labor ratio is slightly larger in 
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magnitude (-0.081 vs. -0.077), but the difference is not statistically significant. The estimate 
on market share is also unaffected (-0.182 vs. -0.184). While the employment adjustment is 
highly imperfect due to the lack of firm-specific labor quality measures in the dataset, it does 
not highlight any obvious impact of systematic variation in labor quality on the conclusions. 
Together, these results suggest that a firm’s labor market position may be relevant for 
labor share determination. However, the dataset does not lend itself particularly well to 
deriving firm-specific variables that isolate this aspect of labor share setting. Therefore, 
further exploration of the impact of imperfect competition in the labor market on the labor 
share, using firm-specific data sources or matched employer-employee datasets, would be a 
valuable direction for future work—especially since a firm may wield different degrees of 
power in different labor markets where it recruits employees of different skill levels and 
occupations.15 Notably, however, the estimated effects of capital intensity and market share 
on the labor share do not change with the addition of any of the proposed human capital and 
labor market variables. They are also unaffected by the attempt to adjust firms’ labor input 
for the average characteristics of the workforce in their sector and region. The main 
conclusions of this paper are still that firms with greater market power and higher capital 
intensity share a smaller proportion of their income with workers. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper considers the relationship between labor share of income at the level of an 
individual firm and two variables suggested by economic theory: market power and capital 
intensity of production. It contributes to the literature on factor income shares by 
                                                          
15 In the UK, available matched employer-employee data suffers from two shortcomings. First, firm information 
does not include a balance sheet, making it difficult to test the role of capital intensity in labor share 
determination. Second, employee data comes from a 1% nationwide sample, so it is not possible to characterize 
the within-firm distribution of employees or new hires. However, data from other countries may be helpful for 
shedding further light on these questions. 
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documenting the wide dispersion of firm-level labor shares and by estimating a model of 
labor share determination using longitudinal firm data, with a focus on addressing 
endogeneity concerns through instrumental variable methods. Its main finding is that the 
capital intensity of firms’ production and their power in the product market are significant 
determinants of the labor share, consistent with economic intuition and a simple theoretical 
model. The labor share is lower when firms employ more capital relative to labor. This result 
is driven by low-wage firms, suggesting that the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor may be greater than 1 at firms that employ a low-skilled workforce. In addition, the 
labor share is lower when firms have greater power in the product market, measured by their 
share of sales or value added. This is also consistent with intuition: firms that face less elastic 
demand raise their profit share of output to the detriment of the labor share. GMM estimation 
suggests further that the effect of the market share is quantitatively larger than that of capital 
intensity. 
The main implication of this paper is that the aggregate labor share of income is 
impacted to a large extent by the decisions made at the level of individual firms, as well as by 
the environment that those firms face. To the extent that the relationships estimated here hold 
in the future, increasing robotization may augur continued declines for the labor share, 
particularly in the segments of the economy characterized by low-wage employment. 
Similarly, the labor share may continue to be under pressure in markets where a few large 
firms command significant or rising pricing power. 
Future research could focus on relating these results back to macroeconomic trends by 
decomposing the historical movements in the aggregate labor share into changes at the firm 
level and changes in the distribution of firms across capital intensity and market share 
categories within sectors. The analysis could also be replicated using firm-level data from 
other countries and expanded to longer time periods that coincide with more dramatic labor 
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share declines. Finally, causal links between capital intensity, market power, and the labor 
share can also be explored further, perhaps by identifying natural experiments that provide 
quasi-exogenous variation in access to capital across firms or in market structure across 
sectors.  
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FIGURE 1. LABOR SHARE TRENDS SINCE 1970 
 
Aggregate labor share is defined as compensation of employees divided by GVA minus mixed income to 
exclude the output of the self-employed from the denominator (see Gollin, 2002). Data for G7 countries 
excluding the UK (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US) is weighted by GVA. Germany prior to 1990 
reflects West Germany only. Source: OECD, own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. LABOR SHARE TRENDS OVER THE SAMPLE PERIOD, 2005-2012 
 
 
The labor share for the whole UK economy and for G7 countries excluding the UK is calculated as aggregate 
compensation of employees divided by GVA minus mixed income. Data for the UK non-financial business 
sector is based on published ONS Annual Business Survey results. Dashed lines represent the lines of best fit. 
The individual plots are on different scales to enable a side-by-side comparison of cyclical fluctuations. 
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FIGURE 3. LABOR SHARE VS. CAPITAL INTENSITY AND MARKET SHARE 
 
Local polynomial plots of the log labor share against the capital intensity and market share variables for the 
GMM estimation sample from column 5 of Table 3. The shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. LABOR SHARE DISPERSION 
 
 
Variable, 𝑥 
Between firms 
𝜎𝑢/|?̅?| 
Within firms 
𝜎𝜀/|?̅?| 
Within % 
𝜌 
Labor Share 0.40 0.60 0.31 
Log(Labor Share) 1.14 1.08 0.53 
Average Compensation 0.41 0.18 0.84 
Log(Average Compensation) 0.13 0.05 0.88 
Average Product of Labor 0.88 0.54 0.73 
Log(Average Product of Labor) 0.15 0.11 0.67 
    
 
This table presents dispersion metrics for the labor share and its components, both in levels and in logs. The values 
𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝜀 are estimated standard deviations of the error terms from the random-effects model, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
normalized by the means to facilitate comparisons across variables. The last column shows the proportion of 
variance due to differences across firms, 𝜌 = 𝜎𝑢
2/(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2). The model includes year and 5-digit sector fixed 
effects to account for aggregate trends and cross-sector differences in the labor share. Sample size is 119,764 
observations.  
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
  
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
       
Sales (£ 000) 119,764 67,006 12,105 633,838 2 101,199,900 
Employees 119,764 317 73 2,926 1 277,684 
Net Tangible Assets (£ 000) 119,764 17,123 974 228,054 1 19,407,766 
Labor share (Compensation / Value Added) 119,764 0.83 0.75 0.61 0.00 5.01 
Net Tangible Assets / Employee (£ 000) 119,764 40 11 102 0 796 
Market Share in 4-Digit Sector 119,764 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.30 
       
Labor Share by Capital Intensity 
(Net Tangible Assets/Employee):       
<£10,000 56,415 0.90 0.81    
£10,000-50,000 44,186 0.82 0.74    
£50,000-100,000 10,204 0.77 0.66    
£100,000-500,000 7,144 0.63 0.52    
≥£500,000 1,815 0.35 0.20    
       
Labor Share by Market Share 
in 4-Digit Sector:      
 
<1% 91,143 0.85 0.76    
1-5% 19,379 0.78 0.72    
5-10% 4,397 0.77 0.70    
10-20% 2,507 0.75 0.69    
≥20% 2,338 0.72 0.65    
       
 
Data for firm-level observations pooled across all years in the dataset. Sales and net tangible assets are measured in thousands of 2011 pounds. All ratios (compensation 
cost/employee, labor share, net tangible assets/employee, and market share) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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TABLE 3. CAPITAL INTENSITY, MARKET SHARE, AND LABOR SHARE 
 
 OLS  FE  GMM 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
  
(4) 
  
(5) 
        
Capital Intensity 
 
     -0.079*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.067*** 
(0.002) 
      -0.068*** 
(0.002) 
      -0.030*** 
(0.004) 
      -0.077*** 
(0.022) 
        
Market Share      -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
     -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
        -0.019*** 
(0.002) 
      -0.219*** 
(0.008) 
      -0.184*** 
(0.024) 
        
Serial Correlation Test        
1st Order 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
2nd Order 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.903 
        
Overidentification Test       0.459 
        
Year FE x x x  x  x 
Sector FE  x x    x 
Region FE   x    x 
Firm FE     x   
        
Sample Size 119,764 119,764 119,764  119,764  119,764 
        
 
This table presents the main results of regressions of the log labor share on capital intensity, market share, and controls. OLS results are presented in columns 1-3. Column 4 
includes firm fixed effects. Column 5 presents GMM results with the lagged levels of the labor share, capital intensity, and market share dated t-2 and t-3 used as instruments 
for the difference equation, and lagged differences dated t-1 and t-2 used as instruments for the levels equation. Coefficients represent long-run elasticities. Serial correlation 
test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value 
for the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with 
Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction applied to GMM. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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TABLE 4. UNDERSTANDING HOW CAPITAL INTENSITY IMPACTS THE LABOR SHARE 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
    
Tangible Capital Intensity    -0.126** 
(0.053) 
     -0.078*** 
(0.019) 
   -0.096** 
(0.043) 
    
Tangible Capital Intensity * High-Wage Firm 
 
-0.034 
(0.032) 
 -0.001 
(0.016) 
    
Intangible Capital Intensity  0.023 
(0.014) 
 -0.054* 
(0.029) 
    
Intangible Capital Intensity * High-Wage Firm   0.039* 
(0.023) 
    
Market Share      -0.190*** 
(0.027) 
     -0.158*** 
(0.024) 
     -0.161*** 
(0.023) 
    
Serial Correlation Test    
1st Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd Order 0.576 0.706 0.833 
    
Overidentification Test 0.444 0.400 0.433 
    
Sample Size 119,764 118,500 118,500 
    
 
This table extends the main GMM results from column 5 of Table 3 to further explore the relationship between 
capital intensity and the labor share. Tangible capital intensity is the log of the book value of tangible assets per 
employee (the same variable as capital intensity in Table 3). Intangible capital intensity is the log of the book 
value of intangible assets per employee. The high-wage firm indicator equals 1 if the firm is, on average, in the 
top half of the annual wage distribution during its presence in the sample, as a proxy for the average skill level of 
its workforce. Intangible capital All columns include year, sector, and region fixed effects. Coefficients represent 
long-run elasticities. Serial correlation test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value for the 
null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction applied to GMM. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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TABLE 5. ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
  Larger 
Firms 
Balanced 
Sample 
Including 
Outliers 
 
Levels vs. Logs  Squared K/L 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
  
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
  
(7) 
          
Capital Intensity 
 
    -0.070*** 
(0.022) 
   -0.095** 
(0.040) 
     -0.056*** 
(0.020) 
 -0.000 
 (0.000) 
-0.019 
 (0.029) 
-0.005 
 (0.038) 
   -0.042* 
 (0.022) 
          
Market Share     -0.192*** 
(0.025) 
       -0.182*** 
(0.050) 
       -0.204*** 
(0.025) 
    -3.292** 
(1.370) 
   -3.602** 
(1.544) 
     -0.094*** 
(0.035) 
      -0.185*** 
(0.024) 
          
Serial Correlation Test          
1st Order 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
2nd Order 0.971 0.792 0.919  0.930 0.949 0.950  0.658 
          
Overidentification Test 0.416 0.981 0.619  0.276 0.232 0.115  0.588 
          
Year FE x x x  x x x  x 
Sector FE x x x  x x x  x 
Region FE x x x  x x x  x 
          
Sample Size 119,121 26,878 119,764  129,878 129,065 129,052  119,764 
          
 
This table presents alternative empirical specifications of the model relating the labor share to capital intensity and market share. The first three columns consider different 
definitions of the sample: (1) excluding firms that are only ever observed with one employee (potentially self-employed individuals operating as incorporated companies); (2) 
balanced sample of firms observed in all periods; (3) without winsorizing any variables. Column 4 presents the results of estimating the model in levels instead of logs. In 
column 5, the labor share and market share are in levels while capital intensity is in logs, and in column 6, only the labor share is in levels. In column 7, the square of capital 
intensity is included and the reported coefficient is the elasticity calculated at the sample mean. Coefficients represent long-run elasticities. Serial correlation test: p-value for 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value for the null 
hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) 
finite-sample correction applied to GMM. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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TABLE 6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE LABOR SHARE, CAPITAL INTENSITY, AND PRODUCT MARKET POWER 
 
  
Wage 
Share 
 
Total 
Assets 
Share of 
Sector 
Value Added 
Market Share 
in Sector and 
Region 
 
Non-Tradable 
Sectors 
 
 
Markup 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
       
Capital Intensity 
 
     -0.070*** 
(0.023) 
     -0.070*** 
(0.025) 
     -0.068*** 
(0.021) 
     -0.079*** 
(0.022) 
   -0.076** 
(0.037) 
-0.045 
(0.030) 
       
Product Market Power      -0.201*** 
(0.028) 
     -0.188*** 
(0.026) 
     -0.154*** 
(0.030) 
     -0.158*** 
(0.020) 
     -0.108*** 
(0.027) 
     -0.660*** 
(0.091) 
       
Serial Correlation Test       
1st Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd Order 0.685 0.747 0.458 0.616 0.076 0.315 
       
Overidentification Test 0.352 0.503 0.253 0.521 0.692 0.626 
       
Year FE x x x x x x 
Sector FE x x x x x x 
Region FE x x x x x x 
       
Sample Size 115,977 119,742 119,764 119,764 52,564 119,764 
       
 
This table presents variations of the main GMM specification in column 5 of Table 3 using different definitions of the main variables of interest. In column 1, the dependent 
variable is the log of the wage share, defined as wages excluding non-wage compensation divided by value added. In column 2, capital intensity is defined as total assets per 
employee to account for intangibles. In column 3, market share is calculated as the share of total value added within a 4-digit sector. In columns 4 and 5, market share is 
calculated as sales share within a 4-digit sector and NUTS3 region (approximately a county), with the sample in column 5 limited to firms in non-tradable sectors. In column 
6, the market share is replaced by the markup, calculated as the log of the ratio of value added before employment expense to revenues, as an alternative measure of market 
power. Coefficients represent long-run elasticities. Serial correlation test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for 
first and second-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction applied to GMM. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
  
 45 
 
TABLE 7. HUMAN CAPITAL, LABOR MARKET POWER, AND THE LABOR SHARE 
 
 Human 
Capital 
Recruits from 
Non-Employment 
Employer 
Concentration 
Effective 
Labor 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
     
Capital Intensity 
 
     -0.078*** 
(0.022) 
     -0.078*** 
(0.022) 
     -0.079*** 
(0.022) 
     -0.081*** 
(0.023) 
     
Market Share      -0.184*** 
(0.024) 
     -0.184*** 
(0.024) 
         -0.183*** 
(0.024) 
     -0.182*** 
(0.025) 
     
Labor Market Power       -0.326*** 
(0.102) 
     -0.023*** 
(0.006) 
 
     
Serial Correlation Test     
1st Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd Order 0.912 0.957 0.912 0.891 
     
Overidentification Test 0.500 0.488 0.508 0.457 
     
Sample Size 119,764 119,764 119,357 119,764 
     
 
This table adds human capital controls and measures of labor market power to the main specification from column 5 of Table 3. Coefficients represent long-run elasticities 
from GMM estimation. All columns include year, sector, and region fixed effects, and human capital controls. The human capital controls are defined as the proportion of 
employees that are female, non-white, UK-born, married, part-time, and with different qualification levels; average years of education, experience, experience squared; and the 
participation rate – each calculated within a 1-digit sector, NUTS1 region, and year using the Labor Force Survey. Labor market power is defined as the proportion of recruits 
from non-employment in a sector-region cell in column 2 and the log of the total number of firms in the same NUTS3 region (roughly a county) multiplied by -1 in column 3. 
Serial correlation test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order serial correlation. 
Overidentification test: p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm 
are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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Online Appendix A – GMM Assumptions and Instrument Validity 
This Appendix discusses the conditions required for the consistency of the econometric 
estimates given in the paper and provides evidence that these conditions are satisfied. 
Consistency of the System GMM estimates relies on three assumptions. The first is 
instrument validity. Instruments are valid if they are strong predictors of the potentially 
endogenous regressors (relevance), while only affecting the current labor share through the 
endogenous variables (exclusion restriction). The second assumption is that the disturbances 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated. Third, the use of the levels equation requires an additional 
assumption of stationarity. I review each of these assumptions below. 
I begin by testing whether the lags of the labor share, capital intensity, and market 
share satisfy the instrument relevance requirement. Consider the market share variable as an 
example. The market share at time 𝑡 − 2 and 𝑡 − 3 (instruments in the differenced equation) 
needs to be highly correlated with the year-over-year change in the market share observed at 
time 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 (the endogenous regressors). Similarly, in the levels equation, the lagged 
market share changes at time 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2 need to be good predictors of the levels at time 
𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1. 
Table A1 reports the results of first-stage regressions that correspond to the main 
GMM specification in column 5 of Table 3. Panel (a) considers the equation in differences, 
while panel (b) considers the equation in levels. Within each panel, the first row shows the F-
statistic from the test of joint significance of the instruments in a regression of the 
endogenous variable on its lags without any controls. The second row reports the same test 
statistic after controlling year, sector, and region fixed effects. Finally, the third row controls 
additionally for all other instruments in the model. The third row represents a standard first 
stage equation in instrumental variable estimation. 
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Column (1) of panel (a) shows that the second and third lags of the labor share are 
strong predictors of the first lag of the change in the labor share. The F-statistic is 4,014.1 
when all the controls and instruments are included. Columns (2) and (3) show the strength of 
the instruments for the current and lagged difference of capital intensity (F-statistics of 219.2 
and 265.7, respectively). Finally, columns (4) and (5) show that the instruments for the 
current and lagged change in market share are also strong (F-statistics of 27.6 and 147.2, 
respectively). Similarly, in panel (b), which tests the relevance of instruments in the levels 
equation, all instruments are very strong predictors of the potentially endogenous regressors 
(F-statistics of 206.9 or greater). Therefore, the first-stage results indicate that inference in the 
GMM model is unlikely to be affected by problems caused by weak instruments. 
The exclusion restriction is more difficult to test directly but can be assessed in two 
ways. The first is through the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Table A2 reports the 
results for the baseline specification. Part (a) shows that the null hypothesis of joint 
instrument validity cannot be rejected for the model as a whole (p-value 0.459). Parts (b) 
through (d) test several subsets of the instrument set for the levels equation and the first-
difference equation separately. The results indicate that the satisfactory overall outcome of 
the Hansen test is not driven by any single component of the model.16 
One potential concern with the Hansen test is that it can be weakened by the presence 
of many instruments. An alternative, intuitive way to evaluate the validity of the exclusion 
restriction consists of removing each candidate instrument from the GMM instrument matrix, 
including it directly in the estimated `second-stage' model, and checking that it is 
insignificant, conditional on the remaining instruments. Table A3 presents the results of this 
test. None of the coefficients on the tested instruments in columns (1) to (6) are significantly 
                                                          
16 In the case of capital intensity, the null hypothesis that the second and third lag are exogenous instruments for 
the difference equation is rejected at a significance level only slightly greater than 10%. Replacing the second 
lag with the fourth lag improves the Hansen test result for this subset of instruments (p-value 0.510) without 
materially affecting the estimated coefficients in the model or other diagnostic tests. 
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different from zero. This result does not suggest any correlation between the instruments and 
the error term of the estimated model, providing further reassurance about the validity of the 
instruments in the GMM model used to estimate the relationship between a firm’s labor share 
and its capital intensity and market share. 
Besides instrument validity, consistent estimation of the model relies on the 
assumption that the disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated, as specified by equation (6). 
This can be verified by testing for first and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results of these tests are reported in 
each of the regression tables discussed in Section 6. Together with the conclusions of this 
Appendix, they suggest that the moment conditions are well-specified. 
The use of the levels equation requires an additional assumption of stationarity. Firms 
should not deviate from their steady states in any systematic, unobserved way when they first 
enter the sample, so that first-differenced variables are not correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity parameter 𝑎𝑖. Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) show that this is equivalent to 
the model having generated the data “sufficiently long” before the first observation in the 
panel. Three tests suggest that this condition applies sufficiently well in the sample. First, 
limiting the sample to a balanced panel of firms that are present in every year of the sample 
period, and are more likely to be older and well-established, gives similar results as the main 
sample (see the discussion of robustness checks and Table 4 in Section 6). Second, the results 
are similar when limiting the sample directly to firms aged 10 years or more in the first year 
of the sample period, based on the year of incorporation (see Table B3). Third, the validity of 
the instruments for the levels equation is tested specifically via a Difference Hansen test in 
Table A2. None of these diagnostics highlight any concerns. 
A final potential problem with GMM estimation relates to overfitting. As the time 
dimension of the panel increases, the set of possible instruments rises, since more past values 
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of each variable become available. In practice, however, using too many instruments may 
bias the results (Roodman, 2009). While it is difficult to say exactly how many instruments 
are “too many,” symptoms of overfitting include an implausibly perfect p-value of 1.000 in 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. To avoid overfitting, I limit the number of 
instruments to the lagged levels dated 𝑡 − 2 and 𝑡 − 3 in the first-difference equation and 
lagged differences dated 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2 in the levels equation, rather than using all past 
values. The first-stage results reported in Table A1 and discussed in this Appendix show that 
these instruments are sufficiently strong to obviate the need for a greater number of them. 
The empirical model, which flexibly incorporates the standard assumptions from the 
literature on estimating production functions, thus appears to be well-specified in responding 
to concerns about serial correlation and potential endogeneity of the variables of interest.  
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TABLE A1. FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS 
 
      
Panel (a): Difference equation 
  
Labor share 
 
Capital intensity 
 
Market share 
 
∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿  ∆ (
𝐾
𝐿
)
𝑖𝑡
 ∆ (
𝐾
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡−1
 ∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 ∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Joint significance of the instruments: lagged levels (t-2 and t-3) (F-statistic): 
 
(1) No Controls 4,447.1 
 
150.5 181.1 19.9 88.8 
(2) Year, Sector, Region FE 4,842.6 
 
235.2 280.5 34.8 130.4 
(3) All Instruments 
 
4,014.1 219.2 265.7 27.6 147.2 
 
Panel (b): Level equation 
  
Labor share 
 
Capital intensity 
 
Market share 
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿  (
𝐾
𝐿
)
𝑖𝑡
 (
𝐾
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡−1
 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀  𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Joint significance of the instruments: lagged differences (t-1 and t-2) (F-statistic): 
 
(1) No Controls 
 
12,025.2 1,354.7 1,942.4 206.9 259.2 
(2) Year, Sector, Region FE 
 
12,990.9 1,321.9 2,007.9 362.6 477.6 
(3) All Instruments 10,506.6 1,082.0 1,671.4 335.9 468.1 
      
 
First-stage regressions for the endogenous variables in the main GMM specification in column 5 of Table 2. In 
panel (a), the dependent variables are in first differences and the instruments are the second and third lagged 
difference. In panel (b), the dependent variables are in levels and the instruments are the first and second lagged 
difference. F-statistics test the joint significance of the two instruments for each potentially endogenous regressor. 
Estimation method: least squares. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. The sample size 
is 119,764. 
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TABLE A2. TESTS OF OVERIDENTIFYING RESTRICTIONS 
 
  
p-value 
(H0: the instrument 
set is exogenous 
 
  
Hansen test  
(a) Overall model 0.459 
  
Difference Hansen test for instrument subsets  
(b) Instruments for the difference equation  
(i) Labor share 0.275 
(ii) Capital intensity 0.102 
(iii) Market share 0.556 
(c) Instruments for the levels equation  
(i) Labor share 0.392 
(ii) Capital intensity 0.258 
(iii) Market share 0.986 
  
Observations 119,764 
  
 
Part (a) reports the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for the main GMM specification in column 5 of 
Table 2. Parts (b) and (c) report the Difference Hansen tests of exogeneity for selected instrument subsets. Tests 
statistics are asymptotically chi-squared distributed with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
instruments in the given subset. The null hypothesis in each test is that the instruments are exogenous. The sample 
size is 119,764. 
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TABLE A3. ADDITIONAL TESTS OF OVERIDENTIFICATION 
 
       
Panel (a): Difference equation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Instruments tested in the second stage: lagged levels (t-2 and t-3) 
 
 
Labor share, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐿  0.002      
 (0.015)      
Labor share, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−3
𝐿   0.025     
  (0.022)     
Capital intensity, (𝐾/𝐿)𝑖,𝑡−2   0.005    
   (0.006)    
Capital intensity, (𝐾/𝐿)𝑖,𝑡−3    0.003   
    (0.006)   
Market share, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑀      0.013  
     (0.012)  
Market share, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−3
𝑀       -0.004 
      (0.020) 
Serial correlation test       
1st order 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd order 0.341 0.730 0.381 0.116 0.387 0.093 
Overidentification test 0.818 1.000 0.841 0.915 0.635 0.828 
       
       
Panel (b): Level equation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Instruments tested in the second stage: lagged differences (t-1 and t-2) 
 
Labor share, ∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿  -0.002      
 (0.015)      
Labor share, ∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐿   0.003     
  (0.008)     
Capital intensity, ∆(𝐾/𝐿)𝑖,𝑡−1   -0.005    
   (0.006)    
Capital intensity, ∆(𝐾/𝐿)𝑖,𝑡−2    0.001   
    (0.006)   
Market share, ∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀      -0.013  
     (0.012)  
Market share, ∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑀       0.008 
      (0.011) 
Serial correlation test       
1st order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd order 0.341 0.069 0.381 0.104 0.387 0.109 
Overidentification test 0.818 0.844 0.841 0.753 0.635 0.311 
       
 
This table presents additional, intuitive tests of instrument exogeneity. In each column one of the instruments from 
the main GMM specification in column 5 of Table 2 is excluded from the instrument matrix and entered directly 
into the estimated model. The serial correlation test is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order 
serial correlation (p-values reported). The overidentification test is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
(p-value reported). Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample 
correction applied. The sample size is 119,764. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Online Appendix B – Additional Figures and Tables 
FIGURE B1. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CAPITAL INTENSITY AND MARKET SHARE 
 
Local polynomial plots of the log labor share against alternative measures of capital intensity and market share 
for the GMM estimation sample from column 5 of Table 3: (a) real intangible assets per employee, (b) real total 
fixed assets per employee, (c) market share in a 4-digit sector and NUTS3 region, (d) market share in a 4-digit 
sector and NUTS3 region for the sub-sample of firms in non-tradable sectors (52,564 obs.). The shaded areas 
correspond to 95% confidence intervals. 
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TABLE B1. TESTING THE VALIDITY OF USING THE LEVELS EQUATION IN SYSTEM GMM 
 
  Firms Aged 10+ 
  
(1) 
 
  
Capital Intensity 
 
   -0.067** 
(0.031) 
  
Market Share     -0.213*** 
(0.036) 
  
Serial correlation test  
1st order 0.000 
2nd order 0.846 
  
Overidentification test 0.339 
  
Year FE x 
Sector FE x 
Region FE x 
  
Sample Size 83,485 
  
 
This table tests the validity of using the levels equation in System GMM by checking whether the results are 
similar to the main specification in column 5 of Table 3 when the sample is limited to firms that have been 
incorporated for 10 years or more by the first year of the sample period. See the main text for details. Coefficients 
represent long-run elasticities. Serial correlation test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first and second-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value for 
the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are in parentheses, with Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction applied to GMM. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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TABLE B2. HIGH- AND LOW-WAGE FIRMS 
 
 
Distribution of sample firms 
by sector 
 Data on the employee population 
by sector 
    (a) Wages  (b) Skill level 
 Low-wage High-wage  Mean gross Median gross 
 Employees with Average 
 firms firms  earnings earnings 
 a college degree education 
Sector (%) (%)   (£/week) (£/week)  (%) (years) 
A  Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 2.1 1.0  324 288 
 14.7 12.5 
B+D+E Mining, energy, and water supply 1.3 3.1  678 531 
 24.1 12.8 
C  Manufacturing 25.6 29.8  603 462 
 19.7 12.7 
F  Construction 8.7 13.4  579 500 
 17.2 12.4 
G  Wholesale, retail, repair of vehicles 30.8 22.9  298 243 
 13.7 12.5 
H  Transport and storage 3.6 3.2  495 423 
 13.4 12.3 
I  Accommodation and food services 12.3 0.8  212 157 
 14.1 12.9 
J  Information and communication 3.0 8.6  734 635 
 57.8 15.0 
L  Real estate activities 2.0 1.6  417 369 
 27.2 13.1 
M  Professional, scientific, technical activities 3.6 7.7  669 577 
 55.9 14.8 
N  Administrative and support services 7.1 8.0  373 308 
 18.8 12.8 
Total 100.0 100.0    
 
  
 
 
This table shows the sectoral distributions of high- and low-wage firms in the sample and provides weighted population estimates of wages and qualifications by sector using 
the Labour Force Survey for the April-June quarter 2012. High-wage firms are defined as those whose total compensation per employee is greater than the year’s median, on 
average during these firms’ appearance in the sample. Years of education are calculated as the age when the individual’s educational highest qualification was obtained minus 
five.  
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TABLE B3. LABOR MARKET POWER AND THE LABOR SHARE (DETAILED RESULTS) 
 
 Human 
Capital 
Recruits from 
Non-Employment 
Employer 
Concentration 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Capital Intensity 
 
     -0.078*** 
(0.022) 
     -0.078*** 
(0.022) 
     -0.079*** 
(0.022) 
    
Market Share      -0.184*** 
(0.024) 
     -0.184*** 
(0.024) 
         -0.183*** 
(0.024) 
    
Labor Market Power       -0.326*** 
(0.102) 
     -0.023*** 
(0.006) 
    
College %      -0.255***     -0.272***    -0.271** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
    
Other Higher Ed. % -0.149 -0.134 -0.182 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.151) 
    
High School % 0.079 0.071 0.069 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) 
    
Low Qualifications % -0.102 -0.090 -0.119 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.143) 
    
Other Qualifications %     -0.328***    -0.347** -0.354** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.137) 
    
No Qualifications % -0.126 -0.128 -0.129 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) 
    
Avg Experience -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
    
Avg Experience2 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Female % 0.135 0.130 0.143* 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) 
    
Non-White % -0.092 -0.112 -0.073 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) 
    
UK-Born % 0.110 0.130 0.114 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
    
Part-Time %     -0.600***     -0.612***     -0.604*** 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) 
    
Participation Rate  -0.455* -0.552** -0.432 
 (0.274) (0.279) (0.274) 
    
Serial Correlation Test    
1st Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd Order 0.912 0.957 0.912 
 
   
Overidentification Test 0.500 0.488 0.508 
    
Sample Size 119,764 119,764 119,357 
    
 
This is a detailed version of columns 1-3 of Table 6 in the main text, with the estimated effects of average 
workforce characteristics on the labor share. Coefficients represent long-run elasticities from GMM estimation. 
All columns include year, sector, and region fixed effects. Human capital variables are defined as the proportion 
of employees that are female, non-white, UK-born, married, part-time, and with different qualification levels 
(default category: leaving school at age 16); average years of experience and its square; and the participation rate 
– each calculated within a 1-digit sector, NUTS1 region, and year, using the Labor Force Survey. Labor market 
power is the proportion of recruits from non-employment in a sector-region cell in column 2 and the log of the 
total number of firms in the same NUTS3 region (roughly a county) multiplied by -1 in column 3. Serial 
correlation test: p-value for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation from the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for 
1st and 2nd-order serial correlation. Overidentification test: p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity 
from the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses, with 
Windmeijer's (2005) finite-sample correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
 57 
 
Appendix C – Mathematical Derivations 
(Not intended for publication) 
 
This appendix contains the following supporting material: 
(a) derivations of equations (1), (3), and (7) in the main text; 
(b) calculations that support the interpretation of the estimated elasticities in Section 6. 
 
Mathematical derivations of key equations 
 
Equation (1) 
 
This equation relates the labor share of income to the partial elasticity of output with respect 
to labor and the price elasticity of demand in a simple, partial-equilibrium model of a profit-
maximizing firm operating in an imperfectly competitive product market.   
 
Consider firm 𝑖 with the production function 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌(𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖𝐾𝑖), where 𝑌𝑖 is output, 𝐿𝑖 is 
labor, 𝐾𝑖 is capital, and 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 are labor- and capital-augmenting productivity, 
respectively. Abstracting from the multiplicative productivity parameters for notational 
simplicity, the firm’s profit maximization problem is 
max
𝐿𝑖,𝐾𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) 𝑌(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) − 𝑤𝐿𝑖 − 𝑟𝐾𝑖. 
The first-order condition with respect to labor is 
𝑤 = 𝑃′(𝑌𝑖) 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) 𝑌(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) + 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖), 
where 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) is the partial derivative of output with respect to labor. Rearranging the 
right-hand side gives 
𝑤 =  𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) [𝑃(𝑌𝑖) + 𝑃
′(𝑌𝑖) 𝑌(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)] 
=  𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) (1 +
𝑃′(𝑌𝑖)
𝑃(𝑌𝑖)
 𝑌(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)) 
=  𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) (1 +
1
𝜂𝑖
) 
where 𝜂𝑖 =
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝑃𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 is the price elasticity of demand. In other words, the marginal cost of labor 
equals the marginal revenue product of labor times the markup. When this first-order 
condition is satisfied, the labor share is 
𝑠𝑖
𝐿 ≡
𝑤𝐿𝑖
𝑃𝑖(𝑌𝑖)𝑌𝑖(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)
 
=
𝐿𝑖
𝑃𝑖(𝑌𝑖)𝑌𝑖(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)
(𝑃𝑖(𝑌𝑖)𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖) (1 +
1
𝜂𝑖
)) 
=
𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)𝐿𝑖
𝑌(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)
(1 +
1
𝜂𝑖
) 
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Setting  𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 = 𝑌𝐿(𝐿𝑖, 𝐾𝑖)
𝐿𝑖
𝑌𝑖
, the partial elasticity of output with respect to labor, the labor 
share is thus given by 
𝑠𝑖
𝐿 = 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 (1 +
1
𝜂𝑖
) (1) 
as shown in the main text.  
 
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 is constant, and the labor share will only 
be a function of the price elasticity of demand. If the production function is not Cobb-
Douglas, then 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝐿 will be a function of capital, labor, and the productivity parameters, such 
that the labor share will depend on both the price elasticity of demand and the factor inputs. 
 
The derivation of equation (8) in the main text follows a similar process, allowing 
additionally for imperfect competition in the labor market. 
 
Equation (3) 
 
This equation relates a firm’s market share to the price elasticity of demand in an illustrative 
version of a Cournot model with 𝑛 profit-maximizing firms, each producing a homogeneous 
product with marginal cost 𝑐𝑖, and linear inverse demand, 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄, where 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖 is total quantity produced.  
 
The market share of firm 𝑖 is the ratio of the quantity produced by that firm to total quantity 
produced in the market,  
𝑠𝑖
𝑀 ≡
𝑞𝑖
𝑄
 
The Nash equilibrium solution for each firm’s output 𝑞𝑖 and total quantity 𝑄 arises from the 
optimal response of each firm to the choices of the remaining firms. In this model, firm 𝑖’s 
profit is 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖. 
The profit-maximizing first-order condition is thus 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑞𝑖 + 𝑃 − 𝑐𝑖 = 0. 
Given linear demand, this is equivalent to 
−𝑏𝑞𝑖 + (𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖)) − 𝑐𝑖 = 0. (C.1) 
Thus, as a function of total quantity produced, and using 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖, firm 𝑖 produces 
𝑞𝑖 =
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑏𝑄
𝑏
. (C.2) 
 
To solve for the total quantity produced in the market as a function of the model parameters, 
note that equation (C.1) yields the system 
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−𝑏𝑞1 + (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄) − 𝑐1 = 0 
−𝑏𝑞2 + (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄) − 𝑐2 = 0 
                           ⋮ 
−𝑏𝑞𝑛 + (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄) − 𝑐𝑛 = 0 
Adding these 𝑛 equations together pins down the relationship between total quantity 
produced, the number of firms, marginal costs, and the slope and intercept of the demand 
curve: 
−𝑏𝑄 + 𝑛(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄) − 𝑛𝑐̅ = 0, 
where 𝑐̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is average marginal cost in the market. Rearranging for Q, total quantity 
produced is thus 
𝑄 =
𝑛
𝑛 + 1
𝑎 − 𝑐̅
𝑏
. (C.3) 
Combining (C.2) and (C.3) gives an expression for firm 𝑖’s market share as 
𝑠𝑖
𝑀 ≡
𝑞𝑖
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖
=
𝑛 + 1
𝑛
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑎 − 𝑐̅
− 1. (C.4) 
 
To see how the market share can be expressed in terms of the price elasticity of demand 𝜂, 
note that 
𝜂 ≡
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑃
𝑃
𝑄
 
= −
1
𝑏
(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
𝑄
) 
= 1 −
𝑎
𝑏𝑄
 
= 1 −
𝑎
𝑛
𝑛 + 1
(𝑎 − 𝑐̅)
 
= −
𝑎 + 𝑛𝑐̅
𝑛(𝑎 − 𝑐̅)
 
Rearranging, 
𝑛(𝑎 − 𝑐̅) = −
𝑎 + 𝑛𝑐̅
𝜂
. 
Substituting into (C.4), the market share can be expressed as 
𝑠𝑖
𝑀 =
(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑎 + 𝑛𝑐̅
(−𝜂) − 1. (3) 
This illustrates a possible link between firm market shares and the price elasticity of demand 
in an instance of a model of imperfect competition. 
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Equation (7) 
 
This equation is a version of the model given by equations (4) to (6) in the main text that has 
been transformed so that it can be estimated consistently using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM): 
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 + (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡) (4) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴(0) (6) 
Solving equation (4) for 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and solving its lagged version for 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 gives 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 − 𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) − 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑗 − 𝜑𝑟 − 𝛿𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖 
and 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 − 𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
) − 𝛽2𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 − 𝜃𝑗 − 𝜑𝑟 − 𝛿𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑖. 
Substituting these expressions into equation (5) gives the autoregressive distributed lag 
specification, 
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝜌𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) − 𝜌𝛽1 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 − 𝜌𝛽2𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 + (𝛿𝑡 − 𝜌𝛿𝑡−1) 
+(1 − 𝜌)(𝜃𝑗 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝑎𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
First-differencing to remove the time-invariant firm effect, we obtain 
∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝜌∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽1∆ (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) − 𝜌𝛽1∆ (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 − 𝜌𝛽2∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
This is equivalent to 
∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝜌∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜋1∆ (
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜋2∆ (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜋3∆𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑀 + 𝜋4∆𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡, (7) 
where 𝜋1 = 𝛽1,  𝜋2 = −𝜌𝛽1, 𝜋3 = 𝛽2, and 𝜋4 = −𝜌𝛽2. This equation can be estimated 
consistently using instrumental variable methods, as described in the main text. 
 
 
Interpreting the estimated elasticities in Section 6 
 
Section 6 interprets the estimated long-term elasticities from Column 5 of Table 3 by (a) 
calculating the estimated labor share reduction that would result from a 1 percentage-point 
increase in the market share of an average firm in the sample, and (b) calculating the 
estimated increase in net tangible assets per employee that would be required to reduce the 
labor share by the same amount as in (a).  
 
The corresponding calculations are as follows. The mean market share in the 4-digit sector is 
1.6%. Hence, a 1 percentage point rise in the market share corresponds to a 62% increase for 
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the average firm. Multiplying the estimated elasticity of -0.184 by 70% implies a 11% 
reduction in the labor share. Since the mean labor share in the data is 0.83, this suggests a 9.5 
percentage-point decline in the labor share of the average firm, holding capital intensity 
constant. 
 
Similarly, a £58,509 increase in net tangible assets per employee is a 148% increase for the 
average firm, given that the mean of this variable in the sample is £39,520. Multiplying the 
estimated elasticity of -0.077 by 166% gives a 13% reduction in the labor share, which, as 
above, corresponds to 9.4 percentage points for the firm with the average labor share. This 
increase in net tangible assets is approximately twice the median annual employee 
compensation cost in the sample of firms (£29,508). 
 
Section 6 also calculates the estimated percentage-point reduction in the labor share for a 1 
standard-deviation increase in market share or capital intensity for the average firm. In the 
sample, the mean market share is 1.6% and the standard deviation is 4.4%. Dividing the 
standard deviation by the mean and multiplying by the estimated elasticity of -0.184 gives a 
51% reduction in the labor share. For the average firm with the labor share of 0.83, this 
implies a reduction of 42.1 percentage points.  
 
Similarly, the standard deviation of capital intensity (£101,742) divided by the mean 
(£39,520) and multiplied by the estimated elasticity of -0.077 gives a 20% reduction in the 
labor share, which corresponds to 16.5 percentage points at the mean labor share in the 
sample. 
 
